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I. INTRODUCTION
“Antimonopoly” was one of the most powerful words in the lexicon of
nineteenth century America. Given meaning by a liberal skepticism toward
the state, it took aim at private actors who sought to advance their own
interests against those of the broad public, often by gaining favors from
government. Antimonopoly had roots in the republican ideology of the
American Revolution and, before that, seventeenth century English political
thought. The language of antimonopoly expanded in popular discourse be-
tween the presidency of Andrew Jackson and the election of 1896. Though
the antimonopoly discourse changed significantly over time, it retained
common features: a classical economics that emphasized the virtues of
those who labored and produced over those who skimmed profits, clipped
bond coupons, and lent money at interest; a fear of private interests cor-
rupting government; a belief that wealth and power should be broadly egali-
tarian, if not strictly equal; and an identification of monopoly with certain
institutions, notably corporations, banks, and organized pools of capital.1
II. THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER ANTIMONOPOLY
Historians commonly see the fierce antimonopoly tradition of the nine-
teenth century giving way to interest group politics in the early twentieth
century. In place of classical economics, with its labor theory of value,
came neoclassical economics, with its emphasis on consumer welfare.2 In
place of the republican tradition that emphasized the virtues of a free, inde-
pendent, and virtuous citizenry, came a broad acceptance that groups and
classes would pursue their respective interests through the political system.
* Kenneth Lipartito is Professor and Chair of the Department of History at Florida Interna-
tional University.
1. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219,
1219–20, 1236–47 (1988).
2. Producerism refers to the belief that those who make things or provide services, either as
owner-operators of firms or as workers, are the most valuable contributors to the economy, and
that intermediaries, financiers, and passive investors do not contribute to material well-being and
only extract the value due to the producers.
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In place of a fear of concentrations of capital came an acceptance that cor-
porations and banks were legitimate and useful means of mobilizing and
allocating resources.3 The trajectory of this change is traced in antitrust pol-
icy.4 Although common law prohibitions of monopolies had long existed,
America enacted a number of statutes designed to directly take on monopo-
listic structures, particularly those of the modern corporation that emerged
in the late nineteenth century. The Sherman Act of 1890 is the most famous
outcome of their efforts, though as we shall see, earlier state level antitrust
acts and laws were important as well. Nonetheless, despite the success in
passing laws, antimonopolists were disappointed in the results and applica-
tions of what they had achieved. During the Progressive Era (1900–1918),
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wil-
son brought antitrust cases against large corporations and even extended
and augmented the laws. But antimonopoly ideas were pushed aside in
favor of a more regulatory approach to big business. In place of the an-
timonoplists’ goals of restructuring the economy, eliminating large corpora-
tions, and breaking up concentrations of power and capital, the new
regulatory approach accepted the logic and efficiency of big business and
only tried to trim its abuses.
The symbol of this change was the Supreme Court’s 1911 Rule of
Reason doctrine in the Standard Oil Antitrust Case.5 Even as it broke up
Standard Oil, the Court ruled that the primary purpose of the Sherman Act
was not to dismantle big business, but to distinguish between corporations
that used illegitimate means to gain size and power, and those that grew
large because of economic efficiency and market logic. Rather than restor-
ing the small-scale economy that the antimonopolists valued, the courts le-
gitimized the modern corporate economy.
Historians argue that from 1911 on, antitrust as an expression of an-
timonopoly was essentially dead.6 Indeed, the very definition of monopoly
began to change. Whereas nineteenth century antimonopolists had used the
3. See generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECES-
SION AND WAR (1995) (discussing the reform movement of the New Deal era and its eventual
acceptance of modern capitalism); MICHAEL MCGERR, THE DECLINE OF POPULAR POLITICS: THE
AMERICAN NORTH 1865–1928 (describing the changing political attitudes of America); RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955) (explaining that the hazards
progressives feared of big business did not come to fruition); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS
(1988) (discussing the emergence of corporate capitalism).
4. The antitrust issue is discussed below.
5. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
6. See generally TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITAIN
AND AMERICA, 1880 TO 1990 (1992) (discussing the development of antitrust and big business and
its place in public discourse); Peter C. Carstensen, Remedies for Monopolization from Standard
Oil to Microsoft and Intel: The Changing Nature of Monopoly Law From Elimination of Market
Power to Regulation of Its Use, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 815 (2012) [hereinafter Remedies] (discussing
the remedies used in antimonopoly cases from Standard Oil to the present).
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term freely to attack any concentration of capital and power that threatened
the opportunities and independence of the small producer, the modern defi-
nition of monopoly is much more limited. It speaks only of hardships to
consumers that result from a single producer exerting power in the market-
place.7 This shift is commonly seen as starting with the Supreme Court’s
1911 Standard Oil ruling, continuing in the New Deal under the head of the
Antitrust Division, Thurman Arnold, and culminating in the Law and Eco-
nomics Movement of the 1960s, with Robert Bork’s successful articulation
of the consumer welfare paradigm into the courts. Bork’s influential writ-
ings linked monopoly power to consumer welfare, and ignored the older
connections to political power and the diminishment of economic opportu-
nity. In this view all that mattered was how firm size affected the price of
goods and options of consumers. Any notion of using the law to fundamen-
tally restructure the economy was reduced to a utopian dream reflecting a
distinct lack of modern economic sophistication.8
As I shall argue, there are reasons to doubt this narrative. Antitrust had
more influence on economic behavior than its skeptics have understood.
More broadly, antimonopoly language affected corporate policy in ways
that contributed significantly to a more equalitarian and open political econ-
omy, even if it did not move the economy back to a smaller scale nineteenth
century model. Antimonopoly distrust of technocracy, bureaucracy, and
concentrated capital has significantly affected the public behavior of corpo-
rations, causing them to embrace notions of social welfare and social re-
sponsibility. The withdrawal of antimonopoly discourse from the political
arena, I argue, has undercut the willingness of corporations to act in a so-
cially responsible manner. These effects were greatly underestimated by
economists and jurists who reduced antitrust to mere consumer welfare
maximization.9
In the rest of the article I will discuss the history of antimonopoly
language from the nineteenth century until the enactment of antitrust laws. I
will then look specifically at the relationship between antimonopoly ideas
and language and the rise of the modern corporation at the end of the nine-
teenth century. That section will be followed by a comparison of the older
antimonopoly ideas and policies with the new antitrust law. Then I will
7. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
90–106 (1978) [hereinafter ANTITRUST PARADOX] (explaining the terms “competition” and “mo-
nopoly” in the context of antitrust).
8. See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and
Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000). See also Remedies, supra note 6, at 817; ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX, supra note 7, at 417–18; Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust
Movement, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 200–04 (E.
Thomas Sullivan ed., 1965); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
212–17 (1976) (discussing the use of antitrust law to promote economic efficiency); Alan Brink-
ley, The Antimonopoly Ideal and the Liberal State: The Case of Thurman Arnold, 80 J. AM. HIST.
557, 557–58 (1993).
9. See generally Millon, supra note 1, at 1228 (putting forth a similar argument).
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discuss how corporations changed their behavior in response to the new
antitrust laws, and represented themselves as socially responsible institu-
tions, allaying the fears of antimopolists. The final section will trace the
post-World War II use of antitrust in place of antimonopoly policies, and
then the decline of antitrust as well in the 1980s. I conclude by showing that
with the decline of antitrust cases the antimonopoly tradition was effec-
tively dead.
III. A HISTORY OF ANTIMONOPOLY LANGUAGE
Early in the nineteenth century antimonopoly had a much different
meaning than it did by the late nineteenth century. In this period it was an
expression of the producerist-republican tradition that emphasized the dan-
gers of government in the private economy and critiqued the power of large
aggregations of capital in corporations and banks. This language informed
American economic policy and legal doctrine in the nineteenth century in
ways that limited the power of private actors in the market. But it gradually
changed in ways that accommodated the rise of large business corporations.
The antimonopoly creed followed a liberal tradition that regarded
small government and vigorous private competition as beneficial to society.
Antimonopolists were fearful of state power because they believed it inter-
fered with individual freedom. But they also feared that the state would be
captured by private interests seeking special economic favors—patents,
land giveaways, and charters to incorporate or start banks. Such favors ex-
cluded competitors and allowed those on whom they were bestowed to
grow wealthy at the expense of the public. They were, in the language of
the nineteenth century, a tax on true production, which came from labor,
particularly labor upon the soil. They undermined the natural order of the
economy, leading to concentrations of wealth that only gave more power
and influence to the rent seekers.
While the effects of monopoly on consumption were part of the an-
timonopoly creed, this was not a modern economic definition of consump-
tion. The adversely affected consumers were also producers, and much of
the criticism of monopoly was about the high cost of intermediate goods.
Some of the biggest contests of monopoly in nineteenth century America,
for example, were those between wheat and cotton farmers and the jute
twine, cordage, and cotton bagging trusts—twine and cotton bags being im-
portant intermediate goods to wheat farmers and cotton croppers.10 En-
grossing and monopolizing the essentials of life was an abuse to be sure,
but the antimonopolists thought of themselves as producers facing upstream
and downstream monopolies that worked against their ability to earn a de-
10. STEVEN L. PIOTT, THE ANTI–MONOPOLY PERSUASION: POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE RISE
OF BIG BUSINESS IN THE MIDWEST 19–20 (1985); CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 126–27
(2007).
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cent living. Even grain and food were thought of as contributors to produc-
tion—the fuel the farmer or worker needed to earn a living.
The center of the antimonopolist doctrine thus pitted the true, wealth-
producing citizens against all who unjustly taxed away the earnings of that
production. The producing class included small manufacturers, artisans,
mechanics, skilled workers, and farmers, but could also encompass local
merchants and banks that directly aided the producers. Not included were
out-of-state banks, financiers, intermediaries who took advantage of a
favorable position in the stream of commerce, and any interest that operated
under a government-issued patent or monopoly. At the end of the day, trade
and finance had “no fatherland but the till.”11 Land and labor were the true
source of the wealth of nations.
Corporations were the special targets of antimonopolists. In the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, corporate charters usually included a mo-
nopoly right. For example, the British East India Company was granted a
monopoly on trade with the Far East.12 The monopoly grant was a subsidy
for private capital performing some public service that would otherwise not
attract enough investment. Private monopolies to build capital intensive
projects such as bridges, canals, or turnpikes were also common in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.13 The monopoly charter allowed
managerial control and helped to assure adequate profits to the corporations
undertaking these functions. Thus corporations as monopolies could be so-
cially useful, but they had to be severely limited lest the monopoly privilege
be abused for purely private ends.
In America, states used corporations to carry out internal improve-
ments. Indeed, the United States chartered far more corporations than its
European peers, and used them for a far wider range of purposes. It
chartered not only public works like bridges and canals, but banking, manu-
facturing, and other seemly nonpublic businesses. Though not formally mo-
11. Letter from James Russell Lowell to J. L. Motley (July 28, 1864), in LETTERS OF JAMES
RUSSELL LOWELL 374, 377 (Charles Eliot Norton ed., vol. I 1894). See also DAVID MONTGOMERY,
BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS 1862–1872 73 (1967) (describing the
radical reconstructionists’ disdain of the mercantile classes).
12. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 22 (2003).
13. See EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860: WITH SPE-
CIAL REFERENCE TO MASSACHUSETTS 196–97 (1954). See also GEORGE HEBERTON EVANS, JR.,
BUSINESS INCORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1800–1943 21 (1948); JAMES WILLARD
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1780–1970 15 (1970); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA,
1815–1846 44 (1991); RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORA-
TION, 1784–1855 5–6 (1982); Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corpo-
ration, 50 WM. & M. Q. 51, 54–57 (1993); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992). See generally JOHN L. LARSON, THE MARKET REVOLUTION IN
AMERICA: LIBERTY, AMBITION, AND THE ECLIPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD (2009) (discussing the
changes that occurred in the American economy between the Revolutionary War and the Civil
War).
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nopolies, these specially chartered entities were created to serve broad
public missions, and thus to serve all producers equally.14
Though corporations found a place in America, the nation nonetheless
limited and circumscribed their powers. In particular, monopoly rights were
granted sparingly, and they were only obtained when explicitly granted, as
the Supreme Court ruled in the Charles River Bridge case.15 The Charles
River Bridge Company had been granted a charter to construct a crossing
over the Charles River in 1785. When Massachusetts issued a second char-
ter to another bridge company in 1828, the Charles River Bridge Company
brought suit, claiming that its corporate charter gave it an implied exclusive
right over river crossings. In that case, the Court ruled that the Charles
River Bridge Company did not have such exclusive rights since none had
been explicitly granted. The bridge company might have been given a cor-
porate charter to mobilize capital to build the bridge, but that did not imply
it could shut out competitors indefinitely.
Early nineteenth century antimonopolists also took a skeptical look at
banks, another institution capable of mobilizing large quantities of capital
and, even more, affecting credit, money, and prices. They saw such banking
activity as potentially harmful to the “natural state” of monetary values,
values presumably set by supply and demand, so as a way to draw off the
earned income of the producer. The greatest expression of banking skepti-
cism was President Andrew Jackson’s fight over the renewal of the Second
Bank of the United States’ charter. This large, federally-chartered, though
private, bank held sway over the nation’s money supply before the United
States had a true government central bank. Jackson vetoed the new charter
in 1832, and spoke in the language of antimonopoly to justify his
decision.16
The bank, Jackson wrote, “enjoys an exclusive privilege under the au-
thority of the General Government, a monopoly of its favor and sup-
port . . . .”17 Here, monopoly referred to a special favor and the unfairness
14. See Kenneth Lipartito, The Utopian Corporation, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE
AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE 94, 105–07 (Kenneth Lipartito & David Sicilia eds.,
2004); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and the Limits of Contractual Freedom
in U.S. History, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE 94,
105–07 (Kenneth Lipartito & David Sicilia eds., 2004).
15. See Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
420, 516 (1837). For an analysis of the context and consequences of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, see STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER
BRIDGE CASE (1971).
16. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR 409 (1957); ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR: A STUDY IN
THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 82 (1967) (describing the struggle between President Jack-
son and the Second Bank of the United States); STEPHEN MIHM, A NATION OF COUNTERFEITERS:
CAPITALISTS, CON MEN, AND THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 132 (2007); PETER TEMIN, THE
JACKSONIAN ECONOMY 29 (1969).
17. President Jackson’s Bank Veto Message (July 10, 1832), available at http://millercenter
.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3636.
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to other economic interests. Antimonopolists believed that favored institu-
tions would grow large and rich at the expense of the common citizen. Mal-
distribution of income and wealth were the signatures of monopolies,
which, to use an older legal language, engrossed resources and forestalled
others from competing in the market. As Jackson noted, the bank was a
“concentration of wealth and privilege . . . with no accountability to the
public.”18 Such economic effects had political repercussions as well. “It is
easy to conceive,” Jackson went on,
that great evils to our country and its institutions might flow from
such a concentration of power in the hands of a few men irrespon-
sible to the people . . . if any private citizen or public functionary
should interpose to curtail its powers or prevent a renewal of its
privileges, it cannot be doubted that he would be made to feel its
influence.19
With their potential to concentrate wealth and power, monopolies were
seen as the greatest danger the nation faced. Jacksonian antimonoplists in-
tervened, seeking to free and restore the market to its natural order when-
ever possible. They removed and reduced restrictions on trade and business
licensing, eased the way of ambitious entrepreneurs into trade, and permit-
ted entry into the professions—law, medicine, and pharmacy—by those
who undertook self-study and apprenticeship.20 Professional licenses repre-
sented monopolistic protections that prevented equal opportunity.
Somewhat counterintuitively, Jacksonians also removed restrictions on
incorporation. In place of special charters—favors given to insiders by leg-
islatures—corporations could be now formed freely by any group of indi-
viduals.21 General incorporation statutes, with no grant of monopoly or
privilege, democratized the corporation as a tool for ordinary business use
and removed the connection between business and politics that led to privi-
lege and monopoly. Likewise, while thundering against the powerful Sec-
ond Bank of the United States, Jacksonians had no problem with local,
state, and private banks, all of which were limited in their powers and sub-
ject to the forces of the free market.22 The Jacksonian antimonopolists were
thus not anti-modern, anti-market, or even anti-finance. They were, as they
saw it, merely working to assure that the economy operated according to the
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. KEITH M. MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 83–87 (1995); Charles
Rosenberg, The American Medical Profession: Mid–Nineteenth Century, 44 MID-AMERICA 3,
163, 164–65 (1962).
21. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937 11–64 (1991);
David Millon, Frontiers of Legal Thought I: Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201,
211 (1990).
22. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815–1848 373–86 (2007).
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natural law of the market with opportunity for all and special privilege for
none.23
We can see the manifestations of this early antimonopoly movement in
the growing use of the term “antimonopoly” in the 1830s and 1840s. Chart
1 records the percentage usage of antimonopoly (with variant spellings)
over time. The bubble around 1830 reflects the Jacksonian concern over
special charters and privileges. It tracks closely with the rise of corporations
at the same time, as seen in Chart 2.
CHART 1: OCCURRENCES OF “ANTIMONOPOLY” IN WRITING
Y axis: Percentage of all words
X axis: Year
Source: Google Ngram
CHART 2: OCCURRENCES OF “CORPORATION” IN WRITING
Y axis: Percentage of all words
X axis: Year
Source: Google Ngram
IV. ANTIMONOPOLY AND THE CORPORATION
Beginning in the 1870s, a number of new political parties took on the
mantel of antimonopoly: The Greenbackers, the Patrons of Husbandry, the
People’s Party (or Populists), the Knights of Labor, and the National Labor
Union. Under their influence the voice of antimonopoly grew stronger. It
also focused increasingly on the corporation, which rose to prominence af-
ter the Civil War (Charts 1 & 2). Antimonopoly groups struggled to deal
23. See HOWE, supra note 22, at 367–410; HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 1–66. See gener-
ally DODD, supra note 13 (describing the development of the law governing corporations); HURST,
supra note 13 (discussing the development of the corporation from an entity formed out of privi-
lege to a business form available to all applicants); Lipartito, supra note 14, at 94–119 (discussing
the rise of the business corporation as an organizational structure).
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with this entity in a changing economy that no longer fit the traditional
liberal vision of small-scale enterprise and a limited state.
Between 1870 and 1900, the United States went through a corporation
revolution. In key industries—petroleum, food processing, machinery, elec-
trical devices, and a variety of consumer goods—large-scale business firms
incorporated and began to dominate production and distribution. They
joined those earlier manifestations of corporate scale and size, the rail-
roads.24 Seeking to protect their markets and reduce competition, the new
corporate behemoths often merged and combined into still larger entities—
generally termed trusts after the first legal form that these combinations
took. Hundreds of trusts were formed, and many individual companies
combined, culminating in a massive merger movement at the beginning of
the twentieth century.25
Having freed the corporation from the state and severed its ties to spe-
cial privilege and charter, antimonopolists were chagrined to find that they
had not in fact averted the monopoly danger. Private corporations, even
without old style government monopoly rights, grew up to exert monopoly
power all by themselves. In certain sectors—steel, oil refining, machinery,
meat packing, and especially railroad transportation—private corporations
were huge, powerful, and dominant. Whatever the modern efficiency-based
justification for such behemoths, antimonopolists kept their focus on the
social and political dangers of these large concentrations of capital and
wealth. Corporations undermined the workings of the free market by taking
away opportunities from other entrepreneurs. They violated the principles
of classical economics by allowing manipulators of paper wealth and stock
jobbers to profit at the expense of hard working true producers. They desta-
bilized the basis for a republican system of politics by greatly increasing the
distance between the wealthy and the poor. They presented clear and pre-
sent dangers to the political system with their corrupting bags of money.
They were, in the words of one critic, “war upon society.”26
One example of this unjust economics was that farmers and producers
had to pay high prices for needed goods and supplies controlled by large
corporations. The price the farmer got for his wheat or cotton might fall.
The price he paid for jute or twine was controlled by the cordage trust, the
price he paid for his sugar by the sugar trust, the price for his tobacco by the
tobacco trust, his whiskey by the whiskey trust. His mortgage was held by
an eastern mortgage company that got financing from a giant eastern insur-
ance company that took his premiums out of state and then sold that money
24. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 314–44 (1977) (discussing the evolution of industrial enterprises and how
they followed the railroads’ example of integration and merger).
25. NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS,
1895–1904 1–2 (1985).
26. Millon, supra note 1, at 1227.
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back to him at high (real) interest rates. Then when the farmer or producer
went to sell what he made with his own labor, at prices determined by the
monetary policies dominated by eastern financiers, he still had to pay the
rates set by the only railroad that ran through his territory and take what he
was given by the Chicago grain elevator monopoly that purchased and
stored his grain.
According to the labor theory of value, it was impossible for hard
working competent craftsmen, farmers, and producers to fail to prosper.
True, a dissolute individual, lacking ambition and competence, might fail,
but not an earnest farmer or honest workman. If they were failing then
something unnatural must be taking place, for in the true natural market,
labor always received its just reward. The proof that corporations were mo-
nopolistic was that they profited, while the honest toiler starved.
Massive maldistribution of income could only reflect some unfairness
in the system, some untoward and illegitimate concentration of wealth,
power and privilege interfering with true market values.27 “The profits
should be equally divided,” wrote Populist orator Tom Watson.28 “But they
are not so divided, as capital wants to gobble up all the profits.”29 Corporate
power reduced the nation to two classes, “tramps and millionaires.”30 The
results would undermine democracy, for “millionaires make paupers, pau-
pers make anarchists, and anarchists destroy nations.”31 For workers who
once aspired to property ownership and independence, corporate control of
economic activity reduced them to a “vast industrial army with no hope and
no aspirations.”32 In the end, democracy would fall to plutocracy. “[A]ll
popular governments must depend for their stability and success upon the
virtue and intelligence of the masses,” explained William Sylvis of the Na-
tional Labor Union in 1865, “tyranny is founded upon . . . long hours, low
wages, and few privileges.”33
This was an economics deeply rooted in moral and even biblical faith.
Americans read Adam Smith closely as a moral philosopher, and added an
27. Antimonopolists reasoned from effects—large corporations, maldistribution of wealth—
to causes: power, property concentration, corruption of government. They also eschewed abstrac-
tions—the market led to some optimal outcomes based on theories of utility and welfare max-
imization—in favor of the lives of real, flesh and blood people. In a moral economy, hardworking
people simply would not be treated the way they were. In a well–functioning, fair economy, it was
not possible for honest, competent individuals to fail or to earn less than it took to live.
28. BRUCE PALMER, MAN OVER MONEY: THE SOUTHERN POPULIST CRITIQUE OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM 214 (1980) (quoting Thomas E. Watson).
29. Id.
30. POSTEL, supra note 10, at 224. See also National People’s Party Platform, in A POPULIST
READER: SELECTIONS FROM THE WORKS OF AMERICAN POPULIST LEADERS 91 (George B. Tindall
ed., 1966) (also referred to as the Omaha Platform of July 1892).
31. Reform Thought, THE S. MERCURY, Aug. 4, 1892, at 14.
32. PIOTT, supra note 10, at 52.
33. William H. Sylvis, Address Delivered at Chicago (Jan. 9, 1865), in THE LIFE, SPEECHES,
LABORS AND ESSAYS OF WILLIAM H. SYLVIS 127, 129–30 (James C. Sylvis ed., 1872). See also
PALMER, supra note 28, at 122 (discussing laborers’ struggles against monopoly).
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even deeper Christian piety to his words. The market was a result of natural
law, God’s law, such as the biblical injunction; from the sweat of his brow
man ate his bread. Nineteenth-century Americans took the words of Genesis
literally. Yet some were living lives of ease and luxury while others
sweated plenty and had no bread. “God never intended there should be one
man and one woman on the broad earth without the comforts of life equal to
the demands of his being.”34 God had intended the bounty for all. “Larger
equality in the distribution of the products of labor must obtain.”35 Any-
thing less was “contrary to the Holy Writ.”36
Antimonopolists believed the solution was to use the democratic pro-
cess to take back control of the economy from corporations and their bag-
men who bought off government officials. Although the Jeffersonian
tradition had argued for small government and Jackson had tried to remove
government from banking and business, the new focus on positive use of
the state still fit the antimonopoly framework. Democratic government by
the people to restore the natural order of the marketplace was perfectly ac-
ceptable. It was faith in the republican form of government that led them to
propose regulatory policies and state intervention in the economy.37 “Any
business that affects all of a great portion of the people, under conditions
where there could be no successful competition by men of small capital is a
government function and should be operated by government,” explained
North Carolina Populist Marion Butler, “for the benefit of all the people
alike.”38 As another antimonopolist put it more succinctly: “The way to
avoid railroad ownership of government is to have government ownership
of railroads.”39 Government could restore the natural order of things, so
long as it was government of and by the people.
Starting with the Greenback Party of the 1870s and continuing with the
state-level Granger parties of the 1880s and the Populists of the 1890s, an-
timonopolists gained sufficient political power to make changes in laws.
They passed state-level antitrust statutes to curb certain corporate practices.
They encouraged the formation of state-level regulatory commissions to
regulate railroads and other public utilities.40 And they contributed to the
passage of the national Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) and the formation of
the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887).
34. PALMER, supra note 28, at 10.
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id.
37. See LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA (1976); POSTEL, supra note 10, at 161–63.
38. PALMER, supra note 28, at 77.
39. Id. at 42.
40. PIOTT, supra note 10, at 14–17.
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V. ANTITRUST AND THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION
For many antimonopolists, the most comprehensive solution to what
they perceived as the nation’s economic maladies lay in structural change,
using economic policy to reshape the economy to eliminate or at least scale
back the large corporation. Gradually they focused on antitrust laws as the
way to achieve this goal. By the early twentieth century, new antitrust laws
had largely subsumed the older antimonopoly language and tradition.
The antitrust movement began in the hotbeds of antimonopoly senti-
ment, states such as Missouri and Texas.41 There, state attorneys general
brought suits against powerful corporate combines using either common
law doctrines or new legislative antitrust laws. These initial state efforts
were soon followed at the national level with the passage of the Sherman
Antitrust Act in 1890. The Sherman Act provided Theodore Roosevelt with
the big stick he used against trusts, combinations, and monopolistic large
corporations. After 1890, the term “antitrust” entered the American lexicon
and grew steadily over the next century.
CHART 3: OCCURRENCES OF “ANTITRUST” IN WRITING
Y axis: Percentage of all words
X axis: Year
Source: Google Ngram
Strictly interpreted, antitrust law was about restructuring the economy
to eliminate large corporations. It embraced the older antimonopoly lan-
guage, regarding monopolies as economic as well as political dangers. As
legal historian David Millon has argued, antitrust expressed “a tradition that
aimed to control political power through decentralization of economic
power . . . .”42 All combinations of power and privilege were to be treated
as inherently suspect. This thinking reflected the antimonopoly position that
in a natural order markets were open to all and fair in their results. Clearly
this was impossible when very large firms dominated whole industries and
were powerful enough to extract concessions from workers and small
suppliers.
41. Id. at 27–28.
42. Millon, supra note 1, at 1220.
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In 1889, Texas passed one of the nation’s strictest antitrust laws, which
aimed to “drive every trust and unlawful combination” out of the state.43
The law forbade all, “combinations in restraint of trade and blocked one
company from owning stock in another. Its passage had been pressed by
farmers and ranchers who sought to regulate the companies that controlled
the price of cotton bagging, beef, and other similar products, but it applied
equally to the oil industry.”44 The result was to essentially bar petroleum
industry giant Standard Oil from operating in Texas.
Standard Oil was infamous for leveraging its control of refining capac-
ity to drive competitors out of business. As revealed in muckraking attacks
by journalists Henry Demarest Lloyd and Ida Tarbell, the corporation ex-
tracted special rates for its oil from the railroads and forced the railroads to
pay the company a “drawback” or subsidy on every barrel of competitors’
oil they transported.45 Fearful that Standard would take control of Texas’s
oil wealth, the Texas attorney general applied the strong antimonopoly law
to effectively keep the oil giant at bay long enough to allow locally-based
oil companies, notably Texaco and Gulf Oil, to emerge. “Without these
laws,” notes historian Joseph Pratt, “Standard Oil would have faced fewer
and weaker competitors in the twentieth century. State laws in Texas and
elsewhere released new competitive pressures in the oil industry in the first
decade of the twentieth century.”46
When the Supreme Court articulated the so-called “Rule of Reason” in
the federal antitrust case against Standard Oil in 1911, the justices modified
the strict structural interpretation of antitrust law.47 A monopoly built
through efficient firm behavior was no violation of the Sherman Act, they
decided. They had accepted the argument that scale economies and effi-
ciency made some industries naturally monopolistic.48 But the Court none-
theless broke up Standard Oil (as well as several other giant firms in other
cases, such as American Tobacco).49 The Court was also clear that the sort
of cartel arrangements between firms found in Germany and France would
43. Joseph A. Pratt, The Petroleum Industry in Transition: Antitrust and the Decline of Mo-
nopoly Control in Oil, 40 J. ECON. HIST. 815, 821 (1980).
44. Id. at 819.
45. HENRY DEMAREST LLOYD, WEALTH AGAINST COMMONWEALTH 52 (1894); IDA TARBELL,
THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 38–69, 167–207 (1905).
46. Pratt, supra note 43, at 831. Other states called for state-owned pipelines and refineries to
fight the oil giant, using public ownership against private monopoly. See PIOTT, supra note 10, at
113, 120–22; BRUCE BRINGHURST, ANTITRUST AND THE OIL MONOPOLY: THE STANDARD OIL
CASES, 1890–1911 140 (1979).
47. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61–67 (1911).
48. Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, Part II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 375 (1966); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY
IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 238–76 (1965); James May,
Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust
Analysis, 1888–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 300–08 (1989).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1910).
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not be acceptable in the United States. U.S. laws banned collusive agree-
ments, and the government periodically brought down the hammer to smash
up big firms that had grown too powerful. Thus, much of the history of
antitrust can be seen as carrying forth the values of open opportunity and
competition, and the distrust of concentrated power that the antimonopolists
had articulated and described in the nineteenth century.50
It would be a mistake, therefore, to see the shift to a more regulationist
mode that accepted the logic of large firms as simply bypassing or bringing
to an end the antimonopoly tradition. Antimonopoly sentiment continued to
challenge corporate behavior and antitrust policies worked against concen-
tration of power and capital. Both continued to shape the American political
economy for decades after 1911. As historian Daniel Rogers has pointed
out, antimonopoly was one of the key languages of reform in the Progres-
sive Era.51 During the later New Deal era, antimonopoly influenced the
policies of Franklin Roosevelt’s administration as well.
VI. THE CORPORATE RESPONSE TO ANTIMONOPOLY
One of the most important influences of the antimonopoly tradition
was in how it changed twentieth century business behavior. Responding to
multiple critics and stakeholders, including workers, farmers, and consum-
ers, large corporations began to reposition themselves as socially responsi-
ble entities in the 1910s and 1920s. The corporate response to critics
included a new set of plans and policies aimed to show that big firms were
not dangerous monopolies but were instead valuable citizens. These poli-
cies included providing welfare benefits to employees—such as pensions,
profit sharing plans, and insurance—and accommodating competitors and
suppliers by reducing illegal, manipulative, and cutthroat business practices.
In certain sectors, corporations accepted some aspects of government regu-
lation, notably in railroading, telecommunications, and other utilities. In the
1920s, professional managers positioned themselves as stewards for the
public good rather than robber barons and corporate buccaneers bent on
profit at any cost.
Typical of this new group of public service oriented corporate manag-
ers was Owen D. Young of General Electric. Young wrote, “The old notion
that the heads of business are the paid attorneys of stockholders, to exploit
labor and the public in the stockholders interests is gone—I hope for-
ever.”52 He was echoed by Colonel Robert Frank of Standard Oil, the com-
pany that at one time had symbolized the trusts: “I am firm in my
conviction that the personnel of a business organization, as well as its pol-
50. WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD 1 (2002).
51. Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, in 10 REVIEWS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
113, 113–32 (1982).
52. MORRELL HEALD, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS: COMPANY AND COMMU-
NITY, 1900–1960 97 (1988) (quoting Owen D. Young).
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icy, its purposes, its current activities, its volume of business and its prod-
ucts are all matters of public interest and that these matters should be given
as wide publicity as possible.”53
Publicly-oriented firms often responded to critics by taking action de-
signed to demonstrate that they were not out to monopolize their sector or
destroy all competitors. United States Steel, for example, allowed its market
share to fall from 66% in 1901 to 33% by 1930.54 The steel giant had been
condemned in the press with typical antimonopoly language: “It receives
and expends more money every year than any but the very greatest of the
world’s national governments. It absolutely controls the destinies of a popu-
lation nearly as large as that of Maryland or Nebraska.”55 The corporation
nonetheless escaped the antitrust hammer, unlike Standard Oil. It did so by
lowering, rather than raising barriers to entry, and permitting competitors to
survive by eschewing price wars and cutthroat competition.56
VII. THE NEW DEAL AND POST WWII ANTIMONOPOLY LEGACY
For a time company welfare programs and the new publicly-responsi-
ble orientation of corporate managers appeared to reduce the threat of an-
timonopoly. But after the nation fell into the Great Depression of the 1930s,
talk of antimonopoly surged once again.57 For a time it seemed that an-
timonopoly policies during the Roosevelt administration in the 1930s and
1940s would result in significant economic restructuring by vigorously pur-
suing antitrust cases and breaking up large firms. This did not happen,
though the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department grew significantly
and laid the foundation for a burst of antitrust activity after World War II.
In the period between 1950 and 1980, antitrust greatly influenced economic
policy in America, bringing forward the long-standing antimonopoly cri-
tique of corporate power.
As historians have pointed out, the changing economic priorities of the
New Deal indicate that the Roosevelt Administration was ambivalent on the
monopoly question. Roosevelt’s New Deal began with programs like the
National Recovery Act, which seemed to embrace planning and accept bus-
iness cartels. It shifted toward antimonopoly rhetoric after 1936, with a
massive investigation into corporate concentration by the Temporary Na-
tional Economic Committee. But despite strong rhetoric, Roosevelt only
embraced antimonopoly partially, and with the outbreak of World War II
became much more accommodating to big business in the interest of na-
53. Id. at 85 (quoting Robert Frank).
54. Thomas K. McCraw & Forest Reinhardt, Losing to Win: U.S. Steel’s Pricing, Investment
Decisions, and Market Share, 1901–1938, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 593, 594 (1989).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 283–383 (1966).
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tional unity and wartime production. Many of the strongest legacies of the
New Deal embraced regulation, not restructuring, as with agencies such as
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Communications
Commission.58
The Antitrust Division under Thurman Arnold, some historians have
argued, best represents the waning influence of antimonopoly. Historian
Alan Brinkley has argued that Arnold was actually an antitrust skeptic, and
had condemned the old style antimonopolists in his acerbic book, The Folk-
lore of Capitalism.59 Arnold ran the Antitrust Division not with the inten-
tion of breaking up big corporations or restructuring capitalism, but to
regulate bad behavior and protect the interests of consumers.60 He was thor-
oughly at home with the new marginalist economics and dismissed as back-
ward old verities of a labor theory of value.61 Monopoly was simply a case
of too few producers and too high prices for the consumer. Arnold’s vision
of antirust seemed to anticipate Robert Bork’s arguments by half a century.
There are, however, problems with this interpretation. Arnold and
other major thinkers of the New Deal Era were steeped in the antimonopoly
belief that corporations could grow dangerously powerful, even if they
sometimes emphasized the cost of this power to the consumer rather than to
other producers. Arnold presided over a substantial increase in the size and
reach of the Antitrust Division and pursued monopolies with such zeal that
he was eventually removed from the office by Roosevelt when the President
turned more accommodating to big business during World War II.62 Before
his removal, though, Arnold had established a strong, resourceful, and capa-
ble antitrust expertise in the federal government. “For perhaps the first time
in U.S. history, the effort devoted to enforcing antitrust laws matched the
rhetorical and ideological importance attached to them,” writes historian
Wyatt Wells.63 This capacity would be brought to bear against business
firms in ways that significantly shaped the American economy in the half
century after Thurman Arnold’s departure and before Robert Bork’s articu-
lation of the consumer welfare view of antitrust.
After World War II some of the nation’s largest corporations came
under antitrust indictments: RCA, Du Pont, General Electric, Western Elec-
58. See generally BRINKLEY, supra note 3 (summarizing the changing economic policies and
positions of the New Deal).
59. See generally THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937) (discussing
the virtues and absurdities, the basic facts and inconsistent gospels of American capitalism).
60. Gene Gressley, Thurman Arnold, Antitrust, and the New Deal, 38 BUS. HIST.
REV. 214–31 (1964); Wilson Miscamble, Thurman Arnold Goes to Washington: A Look at Anti-
trust Policy in the Later New Deal, 56 BUS. HIST. REV. 1, 1–15 (1982).
61. Brinkley, supra note 8, at 567–70.
62. Id. at 564–65.
63. WELLS, supra note 50, at 207.
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tric, Alcoa, and others.64 Under Democratic and Republican administra-
tions, half of the nation’s one hundred largest industrial corporations faced
antitrust actions. Though there was often no substantial structural change
coming out of these cases, the effect was to shape business thought and
behavior. “Aggressive prosecutions forced business to pay attention,”
writes Wells.65
Antitrust cases of the 1950s and 1960s took special aim at practices
that thwarted the opportunity for smaller firms or new entrants to compete
in an established business or branch out into new areas. Fear of antitrust
prosecution affected corporate strategy and managerial thinking along these
lines. “Because of antitrust,” notes William Becker, “corporate strategists
had solid reasons to avoid the futile efforts . . . to gain total control of an
industry by acquiring competitors or forcing them out of business.”66 Like-
wise, in their desire to avoid the hammer of antitrust, firms touted their
socially responsible behavior. Ideas that had been bold departures for firms
in the 1920s became commonplace throughout the large corporate sector of
the 1950s. As Clarence Francis of General Foods put it, “Today, most man-
agers operate as trustees in recognition of the claims of employees, inves-
tors, consumers and government.”67 The new “American business creed”
held that “firms were expected to administer their businesses in the best
long run interest of the public at large.”68 As the editors of Fortune Maga-
zine wrote, perhaps a little too sanguinely, “Capital has become not the
master of this society, but its servant.”69
This social responsibility positioning was not all window dressing.
Large concerns that held near monopoly power invested heavily in socially
valuable research and development, even in basic research from which they
themselves might not profit. They also refrained from acquisitions in their
home sectors. Du Pont, General Motors, General Electric, and RCA em-
barked on strategies of diversification built from their R&D investments.70
The pattern and influence of postwar antimonopoly thought and prac-
tice is perhaps best exemplified through the history of telecommunications.
Until 1984, AT&T had a virtual monopoly on telecommunications, one that
had been legitimated rather than attacked by the Department of Justice fol-
64. William H. Becker, Managerial Capitalism and Public Policy, 21 BUS. & ECON. HIST.
247, 251 (1992).
65. WELLS, supra note 50, at 207.
66. Becker, supra note 64, at 250.
67. HOWARD R. BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESSMAN 49 (1953) (quoting
Clarence Francis).
68. FRANCIS X. SUTTON ET AL., THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CREED 65 (1962).
69. THE EDITORS OF “FORTUNE” & RUSSELL W. DAVENPORT, U.S.A.: THE PERMANENT
REVOLUTION 10 (1951).
70. DAVID HOUNSHELL & JOHN KENLEY SMITH, SCIENCE AND CORPORATE STRATEGY: DU
PONT R&D 1902–1980 55–77 (1988); Kenneth Lipartito, Rethinking the Invention Factory: Bell
Labs in Perspective, in THE CHALLENGE OF REMAINING INNOVATIVE: LESSONS FROM TWENTI-
ETH–CENTURY AMERICAN BUSINESS 97–133 (Clarke et al. eds., 2009).
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lowing a settlement in 1913, and then reaffirmed in the New Deal era.71
Nonetheless, AT&T felt the impact of antimonopoly during the second New
Deal era, when Roosevelt shifted from his pro-cartel to pro-competition
policy.72 It was subject to a massive investigation of all aspects of its poli-
cies and behavior, including its control over patents and technology, the
lack of competition in telephone equipment supply, and the relationship be-
tween AT&T and the captive Bell Operating Companies that provided local
telephone service throughout most of the nation.73 The investigation pro-
vided the basis for an antitrust suit in 1949 against Western Electric, the
corporation’s captive manufacturer and supplier of equipment.74 The suit
sought to separate Western Electric from AT&T, while keeping AT&T a
regulated monopoly of telephone service—the public utility end of the
business.75
A 1956 consent decree ended that suit. AT&T kept Western Electric;
there was no structural change.76 But the behavioral and strategic impact of
the suit was profound. AT&T agreed to stay out of non-telephone lines of
business and to license its technology to all who wanted it.77 The corpora-
tion remained a regulated utility, but it invested its profits in research and
development, notably through its research arm Bell Labs.78 The Labs pro-
duced breakthrough technology that others would develop further—most
famously the transistor, the basis of the entire digital revolution.79 The re-
sult of such breakthrough technology was that a group of non-telephone
electronics firms were permitted to develop the transistor for a wide range
of non-telephonic applications without having to face a massive, dominant
firm in competition. When Bell Labs scientist and transistor inventor Wil-
liam Shockley left the corporation for a startup venture in California, he
seeded what became known as Silicon Valley with the young engineers and
71. See FED. COMM’NS COMM’N., Proposed Report of the Telephone Investigation 2–134
(1938) (describing corporate history and growth of the Bell system); TEMP. NAT’L. ECON. COMM.,
INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER 11829–11998 (1940) (describing the
financing of AT&T).
72. INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER, supra note 71, at 11846–89.
73. Id.
74. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., (CCH) ¶ 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
75. ROBERT GARNET, THE TELEPHONE ENTERPRISE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE BELL SYSTEM’S
HORIZONTAL STRUCTURE, 1876–1909 123–37 (1985); ALAN STONE, WRONG NUMBER: THE
BREAKUP OF AT&T 75–77 (1989); ROBERT BRITT HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY RE-
FORM: THE DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 126–53 (1989).
76. STONE, supra note 75, at 56–80.
77. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. at ¶ 71,137–41.
78. Lipartito, supra note 70, at 133–34.
79. MICHAEL RIORDAN & LILLIAN HODDESON, CRYSTAL FIRE: THE BIRTH OF THE INFORMA-
TION AGE 159–207 (1997); ERNEST BRAUN AND STUART MACDONALD, REVOLUTION IN MINIA-
TURE: THE HISTORY AND IMPACT OF SEMICONDUCTOR ELECTRONICS 45–53 (1978).
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scientists whom he hired.80 The result was to take the transistor in unantici-
pated directions, none of which were controlled by the monopoly AT&T.81
VIII. THE END OF ANTIMONOPOLY
Considerations of the effects of antitrust (and more broadly, of an-
timonopoly) such as these were not incorporated into the much narrower
consumer welfare perspective developed by Robert Bork in the 1960s and
1970s.82 Although not discussed herein, the impact of Bork’s welfare-based
treatment of antitrust was to sweep aside the old antimonopoly warnings
about power, control, and equality. The loss of much of the antimonopoly
critique of power and wealth concentration is reflected in the declining role
of antitrust and anti-merger policies in America after 1980.83
This decline of antitrust efforts has been a bipartisan endeavor. The
best symbol of the change is once again AT&T. In 1984 the corporation
was broken up through a consent decree from an antitrust case begun during
the Carter administration. The case, U.S. v. AT&T, was built on two argu-
ments: first, that changing technology had eliminated the need for regula-
tion by shifting the telecommunications industry from natural monopoly to
competition; second, that regulation enhanced rather than restrained the
power and wealth of the regulated corporation at the expense of the con-
sumer.84 This was, in short, a consumer welfare argument. AT&T agreed to
divest itself of its local exchange companies—the so-called “Baby Bells”—
which provided local and regional service.85 AT&T retained long-distance
service and manufacturing, both of which would now be competitive. The
argument supporting this result was that competition would spur innovation
and lower prices, making for a more efficient telecommunications
industry.86
To some extent these predications were correct, with rapid innovation
and marketing leading to the proliferation of mobile telephones and the un-
regulated development of the Internet. But the promise of competition was
never fully realized. In 1996 President Clinton signed the Telecommunica-
tions Act that was meant to open all telecommunications services to compe-
tition. But that did not happen. Local service has remained largely
uncompetitive, and the Baby Bells began to grow, with mergers increasing
80. Stephen B. Adams, Regionalism in Stanford’s Contribution to the Rise of Silicon Valley,
4 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 521, 521–43 (2003).
81. Id.
82. See infra Chart 4.
83. See supra Chart 1; supra Chart 3. The decline in U.S. antitrust and anti-merger policies
after 1980 is reflected by the rise of use of “consumer welfare” in writing. See infra Chart 4.
84. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1373–74 (D.D.C. 1981).
85. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 170 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
86. PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITICS 219–35
(1987).
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their concentration. Today two companies largely divide the local telephone
market, and one of them, the former Southwestern Bell (later SBC) ac-
quired its old parent AT&T. Keeping the AT&T name, SBC now controls a
considerable portion of local, long distance, mobile, and other telecommu-
nications services, putting back together parts of the old Bell System broken
up in 1984.87 Those who narrowly focused on competition and consumer
welfare did not anticipate this result. Antimonopolists, on the other hand,
would have understood that free markets do not necessarily remain free and
open if corporations are not restrained from acquiring their competitors.
Meanwhile in other communications services, concentration and merg-
ers have not led to competition and innovation as promised. Unregulated
cable companies have established monopolies or duopolies in cable, on-
demand video, internet, and mobile telephone service, with the result that
the United States has some of the highest cable bills and slowest, least ex-
tensive broadband internet service in the developed world.88 Overall, the
United States ranks twenty-fourth in the world in broadband penetration.89
Legislation that removed cross-ownership restrictions on media com-
panies has also allowed consolidation of radio stations and newspapers.
Large multimedia companies have the incentive, wealth, and political influ-
ence to exert pressure on the political system to gain for themselves further
benefits. Such benefits could include: generous extensions of intellectual
property rights, including patents; greater control over content; elimination
of common carrier and network neutrality provisions; and strict enforce-
ment of digital copyright laws against small content providers and internet
service providers.90 Even if consumers might benefit from lower prices—
itself a debatable outcome of such concentration—society could lose as a
relatively small number of companies gain more control over media con-
tent, more power to control new technologies, and greater ability to block or
acquire competing voices. These are the consequences of corporate power,
an issue that is largely unheeded in the narrow concentration on consumer
welfare model. We have missed or ignored the warnings of antimonopolists
on how concentrated power and wealth have economic and political conse-
quences in democratic societies.
87. Kenneth Lipartito, Regulation Reconsidered: The Telecommunications Industry Since
1975, 61 ENTERPRISES ET HISTOIRE 164–91 (2010).
88. HIBAH HUSSEIN ET AL., NEW AM. FOUND., THE COST OF CONNECTIVITY 2013 6 (Oct.
2013), available at http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Cost_of_Connecti
vity_2013_Data_Release.pdf.
89. THE BROADBAND COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT, THE STATE OF BROADBAND 2013: UNI-
VERSALIZING BROADBAND 98 (Sept. 2013), available at http://www.broadbandcommission.org/
documents/bb-annualreport2013.pdf.
90. ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, DIGITAL DISCONNECT: HOW CAPITALISM IS TURNING THE IN-
TERNET AGAINST DEMOCRACY 114 (2013).
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CHART 4: OCCURRENCES OF “CONSUMER WELFARE” IN WRITING
Y axis: Percentage of all words
X axis: Year
Source: Google Ngram
While the antimonopoly trend has declined, sentiments connected to
that language have not totally disappeared. They can still be sensed in the
Occupy Movement, in the debates over banks that are too big to fail, in the
rhetoric of Main Street confrontations with Wall Street, and in concerns
raised about the maldistribution of wealth and income and the stagnation of
wages. They can even be seen with the Tea Party and its attacks on corpora-
tions’ special privileges and embrace of small business. Today’s antimono-
poly rhetoric, however, is fragmented and unfocused. It lacks the robust
coherence of a theory of the political economy.
The antimonopolists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
had a coherent program. By that I do not necessarily mean a correct or
desirable one. Probably in its nineteenth century form, with its roots in
classical economics, the antimonopoly position was untenable. But it none-
theless offered a systematic critique that is now missing, on the dangers of
corporate size, the corrupting influence of great wealth in politics, and the
fundamentally antidemocratic consequences of a vastly unequal distribution
of income. These missing elements have impoverished political language.
Although the Tea Party identifies the nation’s problems solely with govern-
ment, their forbearer, Andrew Jackson, was quite clear that “[t]here are no
necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses.”91
Without the threat of antimonopoly, firms have much less incentive to
position themselves as actors for the public good. Even if they desire to,
they risk being undercut by competitors with no such aspirations. The threat
of antimonopoly once helped to overcome this collective action problem.
Without it, even the best-intentioned firms will find it difficult to act
91. President Jackson’s Bank Veto Message, supra note 17. On the Tea Party, see generally
THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING OF REPUBLICAN
CONSERVATISM (2013) (finding that Tea Party supporters opposed perceived federal overreach and
the transfer of taxpayer wealth to the undeserving); ROBERT B. HORWITZ, AMERICA’S RIGHT:
ANTI–ESTABLISHMENT CONSERVATISM FROM GOLDWATER TO THE TEA PARTY (2013) (explaining
the evolution of conservatism by examining the nature of anti–establishment politics from the
1950s to the ascendance of the Tea Party).
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responsibly and hard to refrain from taking full advantage of an open politi-
cal system.
IX. CONCLUSION
Antimonopoly language permeated liberal thought and ideology in
nineteenth century America. It gave form to a deep-seated belief in open
competition and opportunity for all and reflected a distrust of concentrated
power, both in the public and private sectors. After the rise of large private
corporations, antimonopoly thought gave birth to various reform move-
ments that sought to check and limit corporate power.
Though the antimonopolists never achieved their goal of returning to a
small-scale competitive economy, their ideas were picked up in antitrust
law in the twentieth century. Antitrust policies followed the antimonopoly
logic in the 1910s and 1920s, and caused corporations to voluntarily adopt a
stance of social responsibility. The Great Depression called into question
the efficacy of such volunteerism and, after some debate in the Roosevelt
Administration, resulted in a significant strengthening of antitrust policy.
Antitrust shaped post-World War II economic policy in America, keeping
corporate power in check and encouraging corporations to maintain a plu-
ralistic stance that acknowledged the importance of multiple stakeholders.
With the triumph of a narrower consumer welfare view of antitrust in
the 1980s, the older antimonopoly concerns about power and responsibility
declined. Antitrust went into eclipse, and corporate mergers and combina-
tions were largely allowed to proceed with little opposition from govern-
ment. The result has been to erode the corporate commitment to social
responsibility and to increase the concentration of wealth and power in the
private sector, much as nineteenth century antimonopolists had feared.
